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Abstract 
 
What happens when a breakdown in relations results in mutually possessed objectives 
becoming harder to achieve? This article explores the consequences of the UK’s withdrawal 
from the EU for intellectual property (IP) law and policy. Compared with other fields such as 
Economic and Monetary Union and the development of the EU’s ‘social chapter’, the UK has 
been a supportive and proactive player in internal market integration, particularly pertaining 
to IP protection. As a result of ‘Brexit’, the EU may find that the impetus for further 
harmonization and integration in this field is lost, such as with the EU unitary patent. 
However, the consequences for the UK are likely to be more severe – a loss of influence, both 
over laws that govern it and in exporting IP norms internationally, as well as a loss of access 
to certain protections, agencies and market sectors that are within the UK’s economic 
interests.  
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Introduction 
The vote by the British public to leave the EU, considered as a remote possibility by polling 
companies and financial markets alike, has nevertheless left the EU and UK in a position of 
significant uncertainty. Whether decided on the basis of fears over immigration (or, as some 
may argue, outright xenophobia) and ‘euro-myths’ peddled by unscrupulous UK journalists 
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and politicians (Craig, 2016, p. 455), or concerns over the economy, sovereignty and Britain’s 
place in the world, the vote has implications for the future of the United Kingdom with a 
renewed impetus for Scottish independence, questions over the status of Northern Ireland, 
and of course, Gibraltar. Further uncertainty surrounds the resignation of David Cameron and 
subsequent appointment of Theresa May as British Prime Minister, the appointment of Boris 
Johnson as Foreign Minister and David Davis as Secretary of State for Exiting the EU, and the 
somewhat parodied ‘Brexit means Brexit’ statement of the Prime Minister on behalf of the 
British Government. Uncertain too is when negotiations will begin, with reports of the March 
2017 invocation of Article 50 of the Lisbon Treaty, which constitutes the ‘starting gun’ for 
withdrawal negotiations, potentially being subject to delay. And what, to throw something of a 
wild card into this already somewhat unstable looking house of cards, are the implications of 
the recent decisions and actions on international trade by newly elected President Trump? 
We live, as the Chinese proverb states, in interesting times.  
 
The purpose of this article is to consider the potential implications of the withdrawal of the 
UK from the EU for a specific area of public policy, namely intellectual property (hereafter IP) 
law and intellectual property rights (IPRs), guided by the question ‘what are the implications 
of UK withdrawal from the EU for IP law and policy?’ A number of alternatives to full 
membership have been proposed, from membership of the European Economic Area (EEA) 
similar to that of Norway, Iceland and Liechtenstein, to a series of bilateral agreements akin to 
those made with Switzerland, or even going it alone under World Trade Organization (WTO) 
rules. As this article will demonstrate, however, under all these options, the implications for 
IP-intensive sectors in the UK are negative, ranging from a loss of influence over laws that 
may nevertheless bind it if it wishes to trade with the EU, a loss of ability to influence IP 
norms in its favour through international agreements, and a loss of access to specific 
protections, agencies and market sectors in the EU. This article presents a new contribution to 
the analysis of the implications of Brexit, in a field given comparatively little attention when 
compared to issues such as financial regulation, services and passporting1 in which firms 
based outside of the EU can set up a subsidiary in the UK and thereby gain access to capital 
                                                        
1 This article does not expand upon the issue of financial services regulation and the Brexit 
implications as it is largely outwith the main expertise of the author, but has been considered in works 
by authors such as Mugarura (2016) and Yeoh (2016). 
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markets in the entire Union (for more on passporting, see McCreevy, 2006; see also Black, 
2002). However, by focusing on IPR protection, another dimension of the difficulties the UK is 
likely to experience can be further understood. 
 
The EU, along with countries such as the US and Japan, have been at the forefront historically 
of developing laws pertaining to the protection of IP assets, be they Hollywood movies, 
pharmaceutical products or brand identities such as McDonalds or Apple. Loosely categorized 
as a form of ‘property’, IP is ultimately about the protection of intangible, knowledge-based 
assets. While this undoubtedly causes some debate in the legal literature that will not be 
repeated here, for the purposes of this article, it seems sufficient to define IP law as a 
regulatory system seeking to afford quasi-property rights to knowledge-based assets, so as to 
derive economic benefit from them (for more on the idea of IP as regulation, see Patterson, 
1986). The three main forms of IP can be categorized as copyright, which protects creative 
expression such as film, literature and music; patent, which protects inventions or 
innovations, such as pharmaceuticals, and trade mark, which protects the brands, logos and 
by extension trading reputation of undertakings. IPRs are considered as a valuable business 
asset, as well as of fundamental importance to the economy more generally (see for example 
Hall, 2009; Posner, 2005). According to the UK’s Intellectual Property Office (IPO), the 
governmental agency responsible for managing the registers for IP rights such as patents and 
trade marks, in 2011 the value of IP assets protected by IPRs in the UK constituted £63.5 
billion, equivalent to 4.2 per cent of the UK’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) (Intellectual 
Property Office, 2015, p. 3). In the EU, a report jointly written by the European Patent Office 
and European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO, previously the Office for the 
Harmonization of the Internal Market, or OHIM) states that IPR-intensive industries 
contribute 26 per cent of employment and 39 per cent of GDP in the EU (European Patent 
Office and European Union Intellectual Property Office, 2013, p. 6), with considerable trade 
between the UK and the rest of the EU in IP protected assets. As such, the European 
Commission has argued, these IPR-intensive sectors are a key asset to the EU (European 
Commission, 2011a, pp. 4–5), not only as a general guarantor of continued investment in 
knowledge and innovation to the benefit of European society (European Commission, 2010a, 
pp. 11–12), but as a specific policy lever for addressing weaknesses in the European economy 
in light of the eurozone crisis (European Commission, 2011b, pp. 8–9; European Commission, 
2011a, p. 3). It is for this reason that the Commission concluded in 2011 that the completion 
4 
 
of a ‘single market’ for IPRs was essential to ensuring economic growth, job creation and the 
EU’s continued competitiveness (European Commission, 2011a, p. 6). For these reasons, the 
harmonization and integration of IP laws in the EU has constituted an important dimension of 
the EU’s internal market policies and law-making, with the UK playing an active part in this 
process.  
 
This article adopts a predominantly legal analysis of the implications of leaving the EU for the 
UK’s IP regime, bringing in consideration of Europeanization and the EU’s trade relations in 
order to better assess the UK’s ability to influence IP norms in the future. The article begins by 
considering the immediate legal implications for the UK of leaving the EU, including the loss of 
access to specialized legal regimes for the protection of trade marks and patents, as well as 
the potential loss of access to the digital single market for works protected by copyright. In 
the subsequent section, it considers just how ‘independent’ the UK’s IP laws may be after 
Brexit, considering the implications of laws and norms continuing to bind the UK in the event 
of joining the EEA, forming bilateral agreements, or acting solely under WTO rules, in order to 
demonstrate that even absent EU membership, its IP laws may still continue to have effect in 
the UK. In the final section, this article will demonstrate that while the EU exercises 
considerable trade power, and indeed power through trade, the UK does not share the same 
privilege as a single state – this will have significant implications for negotiations with the EU, 
as well as the renegotiation of protections with states where, by virtue of having left the EU 
and by extension the trade agreements the EU is party to, the UK is no longer protected on the 
same terms. 
 
1. Changing Relationships with the EU: the Substantive Implications of Brexit for IP Law 
 
By leaving the EU, regardless of the form that this separation takes, there will be significant 
implications for the UK’s IP laws. The first, and perhaps most problematic for the UK, will be 
the loss of access to the specialized IP agencies and systems that form part of the EU’s acquis. 
In the fields of trade mark and patent, IP policy has moved from the approximation of national 
laws so as to facilitate market integration (see for example European Commission, 1976, p. 7 
for justifications for the creation of an EEC trademark; see also Kur, 1997; Dinwoodie, 2013) 
to the establishment of supranational regimes. In the 1990s, the then European Economic 
Community (EEC) established the Community Trade Mark, by way of Council Regulation 
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No.40/94, allowing for a single registration at the Office for the Harmonization of the Internal 
Market (OHIM) resulting in automatic protection in the entire EEC upon approval of the 
application (for more on the Community Trade Mark, see Jehoram et al., 2010, p. 17). This 
system of registration has been codified and updated with the establishment of the EU Trade 
Mark by Regulation 2015/2424, which also renamed OHIM the European Union Intellectual 
Property Office (EUIPO). This ‘unification of rights’ (Dinwoodie, 2013, p. 87) was intended to 
ensure that impediments to trade through differences in legal rights in different Member 
States could be removed, ensuring that trade mark in the EU is not subject to issues of 
territoriality or jurisdiction. This creates a problem for the UK upon its withdrawal from the 
EU – the EU Trade Mark is only valid within the EU Member States. This means that British 
firms that have sought only a Community (or now EU) Trade Mark without also securing a 
national trade mark will be required to apply for a national trade mark to receive protection 
in the UK, unless the British Government provides for the automatic granting of a UK mark 
upon EU withdrawal; similarly, this could be problematic for non-UK based firms whose 
brands are protected by the EU Trade Mark, who may need to apply for a national mark in the 
UK. This is already the case for EEA states Norway, Iceland and Liechtenstein, which require 
both a national registration and subsequent EU Trade Mark registration, as EEA members are 
not within the jurisdiction of the EUIPO. UK-based firms in the future wishing to gain Europe-
wide trade mark protection will have to apply both in the UK for a national mark and at EUIPO 
for an EU Mark, increasing the time and cost of application. A UK registration is currently a 
minimum £170 if performed online (Intellectual Property Office, 2016), with an EU 
registration costing a minimum of €850 (EUIPO, 2016). An additional benefit of the EU Trade 
Mark, according to Cook, is that it can ensure protection in Member States where a firm may 
not have a previously established reputation or consumer recognition, which may be 
important in determining whether a sign is distinctive enough to be given trade mark 
protection (2016); by adding an additional layer of complication to the application process, 
UK-based firms seeking to expand into European markets may find that brand distinctiveness 
and recognition in the UK may not be sufficient for EU protection. While assessment of the 
potential financial implications of this move is somewhat difficult to quantify at this juncture, 
a joint European Patent Office (EPO) and EUIPO report published in October 2016 indicates 
that the UK has filed 10,206 trade mark applications at the EU level as a 2011–2013 average, 
rating as the second most frequent filer of applications (EPO and EUIPO, 2016, p. 90). 
Furthermore, trade mark intensive industries constitute a 38.4 per cent share of UK GDP, with 
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€762,325 million value added and representing 21.2 per cent of national employment (EPO 
and EUIPO, 2016, p. 82). The loss of access to the EU Trade Mark on its current terms will no 
doubt have financial as well as legal implications. 
 
With regard to patents, a measure supported by the UK was the creation (by enhanced co-
operation) of the EU ‘unitary’ patent and specialized court (Barnier, 2012), which would allow 
for the granting of a patent with automatic validity in the entirety of the EU, excluding Spain, 
which opted out of the regime (West et al., 2013, p. 105). This system would run alongside the 
existing national patent grants or ‘bundle of patents’ that could be sought by firms under the 
European Patent Convention through the EPO, an international organization outwith the EU 
system which the UK will remain party to subsequent to EU withdrawal (for more on the 
functioning of the patent, see Christou, 2013; see also Kaesling, 2013). The UK was 
instrumental in securing the patent, particularly in the Council of the European Union 
(Pagenberg, 2013), and perhaps more importantly, one of the central divisions of the Unified 
Patent Court (UPC) was to be situated in London, under Article 7 of the UPC Agreement. By 
leaving the EU, the existence of the EU’s unitary patent is in doubt; as the regime is only open 
to membership of EU Member States, and not EEA members, the UK will not be able to 
participate, and legislation establishing the regime may need to be rewritten in light of the 
UK’s withdrawal. It may be, however, that without the influence of the UK, impetus for the 
further integration of IP in the internal market is reduced, as well as serving to jeopardize 
existing integration measures. Tilman argues that the unitary patent project could 
nevertheless proceed by the UK ratifying the Agreement prior to exiting the EU, allowing for 
the UPC to become operative, and then entering into an agreement to continue membership of 
the system by means of a Protocol after it leaves (2016). However, Dunlop argues that this is 
highly unlikely – more likely is that if the EU wishes to continue with the UPC project, the 
Agreement will have to be revised to take into account the UK’s withdrawal, and that the 
unitary patent system will be open for adoption by EU Member States only (2016). The result 
is likely to be highly uncertain; with the UK being fourth in the EU in terms of patent 
applications registered at the EPO (EPO and EUIPO, 2016, p. 90) and patent intensive 
industries representing 13.3 per cent of UK GDP and 8.3 per cent of employment (EPO and 
EUIPO, 2016, p. 81), this uncertainty is likely to impact upon British business. 
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In the field of copyright, the most pressing issue for the EU at this time has been the 
facilitation in the cross-border sales of digital media, be it in the form of music or eBook 
downloads, or access to legal streaming services such as Netflix (European Commission, 
2010b; European Commission, 2015a; Farrand, 2016a). Unlike trade mark, there is no 
supranational copyright system in the EU, only the approximation of national laws (Farrand, 
2015; Hugenholtz, 2012). Therefore, copyright is still territorial in nature, and subject to 
enforcement in national jurisdictions. While the Court of Justice has sought to ensure that the 
exercise of IP rights cannot serve as a barrier to the free movement of physical goods since 
cases, the situation is more complicated when applied to digital media, which is instead 
classified as a service (Dreier, 2013), which can be subject to territorial restrictions in order 
to, for example, effectively calculate royalty payments (Mazziotti, 2010). Nevertheless, with 
the widespread usage of the Internet for the dissemination of copyright protected works, this 
territoriality has been recognized by the Commission as an undesirable barrier to trade 
(European Commission, 2010b) and that restricting access to digital media content by 
geographical location, so that content made available in the UK is only accessible in the UK, 
significantly hinders the establishment of a ‘pan-European’ market for digital media services 
(European Commission, 2015a, pp. 6–7). The UK has been a strong proponent of creating a 
single market for the sale and access of copyright protected digital media (HM Government, 
2014, p. 35), as have representatives of the British creative industries, which believe that 
further integration of the (digital) single market would result in increased economic growth 
and a wider customer base (HM Government, 2014, pp. 80–81). In the event that the UK 
withdraws from the EU on the basis of an EEA relationship, then the UK is likely to retain 
access to this formative Digital Single Market. The Commission has indicated that the 
proposed legislation, including a Regulation ensuring the cross-border ‘portability’ of content, 
allowing for users to access content legally available in their home state when travelling to 
another Member State, has EEA relevance (European Commission, 2015b, p. 10), which means 
that members of the EEA will be required to adopt that legislation in order to be able to trade 
with the EU. However, in the event that the UK instead opts for bilateral relations with the EU 
similar to the Switzerland model, a customs union, or alternatively on the basis of operating 
under WTO rules only, the UK will lose access to the potentially lucrative single market for 
digital media services. UK-based consumers would not be able to access UK-based content 
when travelling in the EU, and EU-based consumer happening to be temporarily present in the 
UK would not be able to access EU-based content. While harder to calculate than trade mark 
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or patent, as copyright is an unregistered right, it is nevertheless worth stating that copyright 
intensive industries contribute 8.4 per cent of UK GDP, with a value of €167,683 million and 
employing 6.3 per cent of the working population (EPO and EUIPO, 2016, p. 84). 
 
Finally, withdrawing from the EU would have implications for enforcement of IP rights due 
not only to loss of access to the EUIPO, but loss of access to Europol, which only provides full 
membership for EU members (Larsson, 2006). While it may be argued that the main activity 
of the EUIPO is in its role as the agency responsible for the EU Trade Mark, the EUIPO is also 
home to the European Observatory on Infringements of Intellectual Property Rights, which is 
responsible for sharing best practices in identifying, monitoring and countering infringements 
of IP carried out on a commercial scale, such as counterfeiting (Farrand, 2017). The European 
Observatory’s work in particular on centralizing information regarding identifying alleged 
counterfeiters operating on the Internet for the purposes of injunctions and initiation of legal 
action in the different Member States (European Observatory on Counterfeiting and Piracy, 
2010, pp. 3–5) is based on exchanges of expertise between national agencies (European 
Commission, 2009, p. 6), expertise which, in the event of leaving the EU, the UK would no 
longer have access to. Furthermore, Europol has been collaborating with the European 
Observatory in identifying key counterfeit markets and countries of origin, again working 
with national authorities in order to develop training in countering commercial scale 
infringement. Information exchange between national agencies becomes essential, as ‘the 
internet is the most significant enabler for the distribution of counterfeit goods, because of 
[…] its ability to operate across various jurisdictions, and its potential for presenting 
sophisticated replicas of official web shops’ (European Observatory on Infringements of 
Intellectual Property Rights and Europol, 2015, p. 5), which may target consumers in one 
particular Member State, but be identified as a site selling counterfeits in another Member 
State. As many of these goods sold come from outside the EU, but are sent directly to the 
purchaser in small consignments, rather than the traditional means of bringing counterfeit 
goods into a country in order to sell in physical black markets (see for example Schneider and 
Maillefer, 2015), the identification and seizure of these consignments requires effective data 
exchange between national agencies. While countries such as Norway do have co-operation 
agreements with Europol despite not being EU Member States, as evidenced by the 
Agreement between the Kingdom of Norway and the European Police Office that entered into 
force in 2001, Article 2 specifically outlines the types of offence in which co-operation 
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between the national and European agencies is permitted. Whereas piracy and counterfeiting 
are identified as areas of ‘cybercrime’ in the European Convention on Cybercrime, IP-related 
crimes are not included in Article 2 of the Agreement. Switzerland, the non-EEA country with 
the closest relationship with the EU also has a co-operation agreement, but again under 
Article 3, this does not apply to IP-related offences, meaning information exchange in these 
fields is somewhat unlikely. Losing access to these central repositories of expertise in the 
EUIPO and Europol may negatively impact the ability of the UK to effectively counter IP 
infringements. It may therefore be concluded that the impacts upon IP law and enforcement 
for the UK through withdrawal from the EU are both substantial and potentially serious. 
 
2. Boldly Independent, or Bound by Convention? The UK and IP Law Obligations 
 
Yet perhaps the loss of access to these agencies, as well as to these IP-focused markets, is a 
price worth paying for newly sought independence? When considering IP, it would seem that 
the UK is somewhat bound by convention. Let us start first with the ‘softer’ exit option, 
namely EEA membership. This type of relationship with the EU would require the UK to adopt 
certain Directives pertaining to IPRs, without the ability to influence their content. Under the 
EEA Agreement Article 65(2), EEA states are required to adhere to provisions on the 
protection of ‘intellectual, industrial and commercial property, which, unless otherwise 
specified, shall apply to all products and services’. The list of laws requiring adoption is 
included in Annex XVII, which includes Directive 2009/24/EC on the protection of computer 
programs, Directive 2001/29/EC on the harmonization of certain aspects of copyright and 
related rights in the information society, Directive 2008/95/EC on the approximation of laws 
relating to trade marks, and Directive 98/44/EC on the legal protection of biotechnological 
inventions. This admittedly will have no immediate effect on the UK, which has already 
incorporated these laws into domestic legislation by virtue of its EU membership. As they 
have been incorporated into national law, they continue to constitute binding legal obligations 
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until such time as the UK chooses to repeal them, a time-consuming and resource intensive 
task (Lazowski, 2016, pp. 124–125). This does have implications, however. The first is that the 
UK will have no flexibility under an EEA model to make significant reforms to its IP laws in 
fields subject to EU harmonizing measures; while there is no indication that the UK would 
want substantial change in this area, or at least that the area was not considered salient 
enough to be discussed in pro-Leave campaigning, it nevertheless suggests that IP would not 
be an area where the UK would be able to strip away burdensome ‘red-tape’ and achieve 
‘control of our own laws’, as so desired by leading Brexit figures (Craig, 2016, p. 456). While 
the decisions of the ECJ would not directly bind the EU if an EEA member, it would 
nevertheless be subject to the scrutiny of the EFTA Court, which can issue advisory opinions 
under Protocol 35 of the EEA Agreement, which requires that in conflicts between the EEA 
Agreement and national law, the Agreement rules prevail (Burke et al., 2016, p. 80). 
Furthermore, the EFTA Court interacts with the ECJ through a process of judicial dialogue, 
deciding cases in line with ECJ decisions (Baudenbacher, 2004), and furthermore, has been 
shown to demonstrate a strong integrationist tendency that rivals that of the ECJ (Fredriksen, 
2010a). 
 
Furthermore, the UK would continue to be bound by new laws, without the ability to influence 
their content, indicating a loss of legal authority and influence, rather than a net gain 
(Lazowski, 2016, p. 120). As EU law changes so do the obligations of the EEA, which has to 
follow and adopt all future EU laws relevant for the internal market, particularly in areas of 
close integration (Tynes and Haugsdal, 2016, pp. 761–762). During the negotiations for the 
establishment of the EEA in the early 1990s, Cotter argued that being able to fully participate 
in decision-making and shaping was essential, commenting specifically with regard to IP that 
EEA states ‘could come into a position of mere approval and reception of laws to whose 
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creation they do not have any sufficient say’ (1991, p. 149), a prediction largely born out in 
subsequent IP law and policy-making (see generally Fredriksen, 2010b; Rognstad, 2016). 
While it is true that the Commission wields the legislative agenda under the ordinary 
legislative procedure on matters concerning the internal market, including IP law under 
Article 118(1) TFEU, the UK has significant influence in the EU Council. Through a process of 
deliberative intergovernmentalism (Puetter, 2014, pp. 4–6), in which the ability to influence 
decision-making is ‘dependent upon the ability to negotiate, compromise, build 
alliances/consensus and be a reliable partner’ (Copsey, 2007, p. 14), the UK has wielded 
considerable influence, both being on the ‘winning’ side of negotiations 87 per cent of the time 
and UK officials being at the heart of EU bargaining, constituting the best connected officials in 
the Council (Hix, 2016, pp. 202–204). Through leaving the EU, the ability to shape IP laws that 
may nevertheless bind it will be severely curtailed.  
 
In the event of choosing not to pursue the EEA option, but instead pursuing subject-specific 
bilateral agreements in the same way as Switzerland negotiates with the EU (Lavenex, 2009), 
facilitation of trade in IP protected materials such as digital media would require specific 
agreements to be concluded. Over the space of 40 years, the EU has concluded just 20 
significant agreements with Switzerland on a range of subjects such as free movement of 
persons, civil aviation and education, as well as 100 minor agreements – these are however all 
negotiated sector by sector (Gstöhl, 2015) in a form of ‘non-adhesive integration’ with the EU 
legal order (Vallet, 2012, p.  377), also referred to as ‘integration without membership’ (Vahl 
and Gromilund, 2006). However, this process can be considered slow, laborious and 
technically complex (Burke et al., 2016; Lazowski, 2016). If the process of EU–UK negotiations 
is as slow, which could be the case given the complexity of negotiations and the limited trade 
expertise currently possessed by the country, the position of IP-intensive sectors based in the 
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UK but trading in the EU may be one of an uncomfortable limbo. It is worth commenting here 
that the repercussions for the EU may not be so negative – the withdrawal of the UK may 
allow for further and deeper integration of areas of IP such as copyright law, as has been 
argued recently by some academics (see Sinodinou, 2016 for one example), which has been 
marked by a difference between ‘Anglo-American’ and ‘Continental’ approaches that prioritise 
differently the economic dimension and ‘moral’ dimension of copyright, which focuses on the 
rights of the author as a person rather than purely on the financial element. Such an argument 
must be made cautiously, however; this divergence in approach to copyright has been 
somewhat exaggerated (Strowel, 1994), and while the UK has been much more sceptical of 
deeper integration in fields such as Economic and Monetary Policy and social rights, it has 
been much more supportive of market integration including in the field of IP. By pursuing 
such an option, the UK may be able to facilitate trade in IP-protected works through 
regulatory convergence with EU IP standards. However, such an approach would again have 
implications for UK ‘independence’. Swiss–EU relations are marked by a self-imposed 
limitation on sovereignty, with Switzerland harmonizing its commercial laws with the EU to 
facilitate trade. Internal laws pertaining to economic matters are scrutinized in order to 
ensure compatibility with EU law resulting in a process of Europeanization without 
institutionalization, in which EU law is transposed through autonomous adaptation (Linder, 
2013, p. 191). The restriction of national autonomy this necessitates, however, combined with 
the reluctance of the Swiss population to engage in further bilateral negotiations (particularly 
in light of migration-related issues) (Linder, 2013, p. 199) may constitute a dark omen for the 
UK, where a British population leaning towards a ‘hard’ Brexit may find even this level of 
integration unacceptable – indeed, as was noted in 2015 by Joseph Weiler, it is ‘the very idea 
of membership in a Union such as the EU which at the end of the day simply does not sit well’ 
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(Weiler, 2015, p. 2). Suggesting a form of co-ordination with the EU in which EU laws are 
adopted without any say in their drafting may not be politically acceptable. 
 
What if the UK pursued a WTO or Free Trade Agreement approach? Ultimately, with regard to 
IP protection, the UK would still find its ability to decide its own laws constrained. At the 
international level, IP is protected by the Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual 
Property Rights, or TRIPS, concluded as part of the Uruguay Round of GATT negotiations. 
Ratification of TRIPS is a pre-requisite for WTO membership, with the result that abidance by 
the TRIPS requirements is necessary for the UK’s membership of the organization. Those 
proponents of a WTO-only relationship may find however that negotiations are required to 
redefine its legal relationship with the WTO, albeit that the UK is argued to already constitute 
a member of the WTO independent of its EU membership, with its own rights and obligations 
independent of the WTO in line with WTO jurisprudence (Bartels, 2016, pp. 4–7). However, 
the process of ‘uncoupling’ its membership from that of the EU may nevertheless be legally 
and politically complex (Ungphakorn, 2016). ‘Mere’ renegotiation of the schedules of the WTO 
is by no means a straightforward or speedy process (Williams, 2008), with former WTO 
official Peter Ungphakorn stating that British renegotiation is ‘not impossible, but it won’t be 
sorted out quickly’ (Beattie, 2016). Internationally, then, the UK’s position in the world 
trading order, and its status as party to the TRIPS Agreement are both indeterminate – while 
undoubtedly TRIPS-compliant as a nation, the UK may nevertheless find its grey legal status 
uncomfortable if it is determined that formal accession to the WTO and ratification of TRIPS 
as an individual state party is deemed necessary. In addition, the UK is also a member of the 
World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) and will remain subject to its treaties, such 
as the WIPO Copyright Treaty and WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty by means of 
national incorporation of the provisions by way of the Information Society Directive 
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(2001/29/EC), although as ratification was performed by the EU under its exclusive 
competence in external trade issues under Article 218(3) TFEU, the UK will likely need to re-
examine and potentially renegotiate the terms of international agreements should it wish to 
either withdraw from them, or ratify as an independent state, a laborious and complicated 
process (Koutrakos, 2015, p. 2). However, as the next section of this article will demonstrate, 
(re)negotiation of agreements with other states may pose something of a difficulty for the UK. 
 
3. Cast Adrift? Brexit and a Global Loss of Influence over IP Law and Norms 
 
What if the UK attempted to negotiate something akin to a Free Trade Agreement (FTA) with 
the EU with principles pertaining to IP? Under the Treaty of Lisbon, the EU’s Common 
Commercial Policy (CCP) was expanded to include specific exclusive competence over 
commercial aspects of IP protection (Müller-Graff, 2008, p. 190), now covered by Article 
207(1) TFEU. In the interest of achieving a uniform approach to trade liberalization, Member 
States have in effect transferred their competences to conclude trade agreements to the EU, 
meaning that they are unable to conclude bilateral or plurilateral agreements with third states 
unless specifically empowered to by the EU institutions. The EU wields not only formidable 
power in trade, but formidable power through trade (Meunier and Nicolaïdis, 2006), 
constitutive of a deep trade agenda aimed at ensuring that EU-based firms are able to reap 
substantial benefits from trade liberalization while protecting and facilitating its own policy 
objectives and preferences internally. As Araujo has put it, ‘it is globalization on the EU’s 
terms’ (2016, p. 46). The EU has conducted a significant number of FTAs and Stability and 
Association Agreements (SAAs) that have trade dimensions with states and regions, including 
agreements in force such as with South Korea, Jordan and Lebanon as well as countries in the 
EU’s neighbourhood such as Albania, Moldova, Montenegro and Kosovo. Should the UK 
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attempt the negotiation of such an agreement with the EU, it may find that the EU’s power 
through trade, representing a bloc of 27 states upon which the UK substantially depends 
economically, results in the negotiation being on the EU’s terms.  
 
A number of agreements have been concluded (but only provisionally applied pending 
successful ratification of all parties) with countries such as Colombia, Peru and the Ukraine, as 
well as agreements with regions such as the Central American trade agreement with six 
Central American states, and the Caribbean Forum Economic Partnership Agreement. 
Furthermore, the EU is currently negotiating or concluding trade agreements with the US (the 
Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership), although its status is debatable given the 
election of Donald Trump, Canada (the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement), 
which now appears to be ready for ratification, Japan, and African regions such as the Eastern 
African Community. While agreements such as those concluded with Colombia, Peru and the 
Caribbean Forum undoubtedly provide some benefits for those nations, the main benefit is for 
the IP-intensive sectors in the EU, which gain protections and rules for enforcement that go 
far beyond the standards provided for in the TRIPS Agreement (see generally Maskus, 2013). 
This is particularly the case for developing sectors such as the protection of geographical 
indications of origin, a sui generic form of protection for agricultural products deemed to 
possess intrinsic qualities, such as feta cheese, prosciutto di parma or Portuguese linguíça (on 
GIs see Blakeney, 2014; Calboli, 2015), identified as a key ‘offensive’ interest in trade 
agreements by the European Commission (Farrand, 2016b). GI protected foodstuffs are of 
considerable financial value to the EU and its agricultural producers, worth €15.8 billion in 
2012 with an increase in sale value between 2005 and 2010 of 19 per cent (Chever et al., 
2012, p. 16). The EU has adopted a position of exporting its norms for the protection of GIs by 
way of trade agreements, ensuring the protection of EU-produced products such as Feta in 
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third countries, ensuring that only those cheeses produced within the EU subject to the 
requirements of the GI regime can use the name Feta. For example, the EU–South Korea Free 
Trade Agreement contains in Annex 10.A a list of products that must be afforded GI protection 
in South Korea, which includes products such as French cheeses, Italian cured meats and 
Czech beers. While there are no specific British products listed, what is apparent is the 
reciprocal nature of GI protection, with an agreement that certain EU-based GIs will be 
respected in South Korea, and vice versa. Furthermore, the strength of the EU in exporting its 
norms on IP protection throughout the world have been on the basis of its collective 
bargaining power as an economically dominant regional bloc able to offer ‘sweeteners’ to 
(often, but not always) developing countries as a means of ensuring compliance with EU IP 
laws (see for example Jaeger, 2013, pp. 203–204). It is debatable whether the UK acting as a 
single state without the collective power of the EU would have the same capacity to influence 
IP norms. 
 
The UK is unlikely to be able to match this ability to export IP norms by way of trade 
agreements subsequent to leaving the EU. This is for two key reasons; the first is an issue of 
expertise, and the second an issue of importance. On the topic of expertise, with the 
negotiation of trade agreements constituting an exclusive EU competence, the UK has had less 
need to employ trade negotiators at the Foreign Office, and as a result, needs to hire a large 
number of staff to fulfil this role (Rutter and White, 2016). The UK currently has a civil service 
that is, according to one source, under-staffed, demoralized, and lacking in trade-related 
expertise (Barnard, 2016, p. 485). The government has estimated that it will need to employ 
approximately 700–750 negotiators, both for its complex and time-critical deliberations with 
the EU, as well as to begin to establish trade agreements with extra-communitarian states 
(Parker et al., 2016). This comparative lack of expertise puts the UK at a significant 
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disadvantage when negotiating the terms of its withdrawal from the EU, which would 
presumably also include provisions concerning the protection of IP, particularly as it relates 
to the free movement of goods and services. However, given the likelihood that the UK will 
have more pressing issues to discuss with the EU, such as the conditions for market access, 
the (unlikely) compromises on the free movement of people while retaining access to markets 
for goods, services and capital and the passporting of UK-based financial firms, IP law is 
unlikely to be considered high priority to negotiators. It also has significant implications for 
the UK’s negotiation of agreements with other states. As discussed above, international 
agreements the UK is party to by way of its membership of the EU will cease to apply for the 
UK subsequent to its withdrawal. Should CETA be ratified and enter into force, for example, 
the UK will no longer be a party to it; the same applies equally to the existing EU agreement 
with South Korea. In order to benefit from the same IP protections it currently enjoys under 
these agreements, the UK will have to renegotiate with those states. The difficulty for the UK is 
its lack of trade expertise at this point in time, compounded by the reality that while it may 
represent an attractive market, it does not have the same trade attractiveness (and indeed 
negotiating power) as a large trade bloc such as the EU (Lazowski, 2016). Indeed, at the time 
of writing, a number of states, including Australia, Brazil, Canada and India, have indicated 
that they have no immediate plans to enter into negotiations for trade agreements with the 
UK, and certainly not before its relationship with the EU is clarified (see for example Giles, 
2016; The Economist, 2016). 
 
Concluding Thoughts 
 
If this article appears somewhat negative in its assessment of the potential impacts upon the 
UK as a result of the decision to leave the EU, it is due to the unfortunate conclusion that this 
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withdrawal harms the UK more than it does the EU. While the UK has served as a driver of 
further integration of IP laws in the EU due to its support of its market goals (that have not 
necessarily translated into other policy areas), the potential loss of impetus for integration is a 
setback for the EU that pales in comparison to the loss of influence and protection that the UK 
may suffer as a result of this decision. In an era of increased global trade competition, one of 
the biggest strengths of the EU in its norm exportation and securing of regional interests has 
been the ability to act collectively as part of an economic bloc, a strength that the UK 
independently does not share. Furthermore, if the UK wishes to secure access to the internal 
market, it may nevertheless be bound by IP laws it has little ability to shape. Finally, with 
withdrawal from the EU comes loss of access to systems of protection such as the EU Trade 
Mark, a loss of access to agencies sharing expertise and enforcement information such as the 
EUIPO and Europol, and the creation of legal uncertainties regarding its ability to access the 
digital single market. Furthermore, the UK will find that its sovereignty post-Brexit is not as 
evident as it may believe as it pertains to IPRs, with a number of existing legal obligations, 
including under the TRIPS Agreement, which the UK is required to comply with, unless it 
seeks to also leave the WTO. With the need to renegotiate certain other international 
agreements the EU is already part of, but without the force of a 28 state bloc behind it, UK 
based IP-intensive firms may find that they face a period of significant uncertainty with 
regard to how, if at all, key sectors will be protected post-Brexit. While it may be bold, the UK 
may find that its position with regard to IPRs is not so independent; instead, it runs the risk of 
being politically isolated, and legally cut adrift. 
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